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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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NO. 47373-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2011-8455
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jacob Miller was on probation for almost six and one-half years for domestic battery.
After admitting to violating his probation, the district court revoked his probation and executed a
sentence of ten years, with two years fixed. Mr. Miller appeals and argues the district court
abused its discretion by revoking his probation.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In June 2011, the State filed a criminal complaint alleging Mr. Miller committed the
crimes of attempted strangulation, felony domestic violence, and resisting or obstructing officers.
(R., pp.15-17.) After a preliminary hearing was held, Mr. Miller's case was bound over to the
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district court. (R., pp.45-47.) An Information was filed with the same allegations as the
Complaint. (R., pp.49-50.)
Mr. Miller subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the State pursuant to which
he would admit to felony domestic violence and, in exchange, the State would drop the other two
counts. (R., pp.57-64.) The court accepted Mr. Miller's plea and sentenced him to ten years, with
two years fixed, then retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.74-77.) After he successfully completed his
rider, the court suspended his sentence and placed him on probation for ten years. (See R., pp.82,
85-87.)
Mr. Miller admitted to violating his probation almost five years later. (R., p.11 7.) The
Court revoked his probation, then placed Mr. Miller back on probation for an additional two
years beginning that day. (R., p.119 (court minutes), pp.121-22 (Order Suspending Sentence and
Reinstating Probation).)
Six months later, Mr. Miller was agam alleged to have violated his probation.
(R., pp.136-48.) Mr. Miller again admitted to violating his probation. (July 2, 2019 Tr., p.10,
L.18 - p.11, L.7.) 1 The Court revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence often
years, with two years fixed. (August 20, 2019 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-7; R., pp.159-60.) Mr. Miller filed a
Motion to Reduce Sentence, which was denied. (R., pp.162-63 (Motion to Reduce Sentence),
pp.170-72 (Order Denying Rule 35 Motion for Reduction ofSentence).) 2
Mr. Miller timely appealed from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.165-66.)
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Because there are two separate transcripts, each will be referred to by the date of the hearing,
e.g. "July 2, 2019 Tr.", and "August 20, 2019 Tr."
2
The denial of Mr. Miller's Rule 35 is not being challenged as part of this appeal.
2

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Miller's probation and executed
his underlying sentence often years, with two years fixed?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Miller's Probation And Executed
His Underlying Sentence Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed
The district court is empowered to revoke a defendant's probation under certain
circumstances. LC. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, 20-222. The court uses a two-step analysis to
determine whether to revoke probation. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the
court determines "whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation." Id. Second, "[i]f it
is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation," the court
examines "what should be the consequences of that violation." Id. The determination of a
probation violation and the determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
The latter determination is discretionary. State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 920-21 (1993)
("After a probation violation has been proven, the decision as to whether to revoke probation and
order a previously imposed sentence is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court."),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original).
Mr. Miller asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation
and executing a sentence of ten years, with two years fixed. He does not challenge his
admissions to violating his probation. (Tr. p.38, L.6 - p.40, L.24.) "When a probationer admits to
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a direct violation of her probation agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required.”
State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Instead, Mr. Miller submits that the district
court did not exercise reason, and thus abused its discretion, by revoking his probation, as
revocation was inconsistent with the recommendation from his supervising probation officer’s
recommendation and because there were other options that would be better suited for his
rehabilitation.
“The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated
under proper control and supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977). “In
determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider whether probation is meeting the
objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society.” State v. Upton,
127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may consider the defendant’s conduct before and
during probation. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987).
Here, Mr. Miller submits that probation had been achieving its rehabilitative objective for
a long period of time and that the court did not properly consider the mitigating evidence before
executing his underlying sentence. He had been on probation for over six years and five months.
(See R., pp.85-87 (order placing him on probation for ten years, dated September 26, 2012),
R., pp.136-37 (Motion for Probation Violation (showing allegations of possession of an alcoholic
beverage) dated February 27, 2019).) After three years of successful probation, the new district
judge assigned to his case removed the condition for random urinalysis (“UA”) tests because
Mr. Miller had no reported alcohol problems during that time. (R., p.99; see also PSI, p.179
(probation officer (“PO”) stating records of all of his UA’s during his probation term showed
“[a]ll Neg., no no shows and one dilute in 2013”).) For another three years after removal of the
UA testing requirement, Mr. Miller had no additional problems on probation.
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Mr. Miller’s conduct during probation also showed he was able to succeed on probation
and be a productive member of society. For example, Mr. Miller told his PO he wanted the
condition for UA tests removed so he could put the money used for that testing “toward
restitution.” (PSI, p.180.) In addition, during his probation, Mr. Miller worked diligently to
regain custody of his then

son. During that process, the social worker in charge

of determining if that reunification would be possible “confirmed that all is well from her side
[and that] she is pushing for the custody to be given [to Mr. Miller].” (PSI, p.173.) Within the
next year, Mr. Miller had secured housing for himself and his son and they were allowed to live
together. (See PSI, p.176.) Mr. Miller acknowledges that his son made various allegations during
the time they were living together; but those allegations were determined to be unfounded, as his
son had made them in an “attempt to move [in] with his aunt.” (PSI, p.181.) When those
concerns were raised, his PO spoke with the social worker assigned to Mr. Miler’s son and
informed her that he had “not seen any major issues” and that the son’s allegations “appeared to
be unfounded.” (PSI, p.182.) The social worker agreed that she “had no concerns” regarding
Mr. Miller. (PSI, p.182.)
In addition, Mr. Miller asserts that the district court did not properly weigh his remorse
and willingness to acknowledge responsibility for his actions. He has taken responsibility for his
actions and their impact on others. (See PSI, pp.172, 173 (statements from treatment provider
that Mr. Miller “admits abuse was wrong unconditionally” and that he “identifies short & long
term impact of [his] abuse on partner and children”), p.174 (statement from treatment provider
that Mr. Miller “takes responsibility for the crime, and the impact it had on the victim and the
child”), p.195 (“I was selfish and I take [sole accountability]”); August 20, 2019 Tr., p.11, L.23 –
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p.12, L.1 (“I also want to apologize to the Court for putting myself in this situation. And I am
ready to deal with the repercussions and the consequences of this court.”).)
In addition, Mr. Miller has serious health concerns that were not properly considered.
Health problems are a factor a district court may consider as mitigating evidence. See State v.
James, 112 Idaho 239, 243-44 (Ct. App. 1986). During the admit/deny hearing, Mr. Miller
informed the court he “has a pacemaker and has serious health concerns.” (July 2, 2019 Hearing
Tr., p.12, Ls.11-12.) These heart problems began during his probation. His PO reported in
December 2015, he received a voicemail from Mr. Miller’s mother “stating that [Mr. Miller] was
in the hospital and ‘dying’ and that he wouldn’t be making his apt on 12/15. She said that he was
in critical care and had ‘open heart surgery.’” (PSI, p.185.) His PO verified that Mr. Miller had
suffered a heart attack that required surgery and a pacemaker, and that there were additional
complications afterwards. (PSI, p.186.) Mr. Miller continued to have recurrent health
complications. (See PSI, p.187 (PO reporting that Mr. Miller “was in the hospital for a blood clot
in his lungs”). These health problems caused recurring problems that impacted Mr. Miller
throughout his probation and have continued to cause problems to this day. (See PSI, p.187 (PO
reporting that Mr. Miller “has had a stroke and has a peacemaker. [He] stated he had to learn
how to talk, walk, and live again after the stroke. [He had] a temporary surgery and needs one
more in about 5 years for an artificial artery”); July 2, 2019 Hearing Tr., p.12, Ls.11-21 (“There
have been some pretty severe issues at the jail with running tests on his pacemaker [that his
medical provider] essentially directed the jail to quit doing it because they’re taking battery life
out of his pacemaker. I think every time they run a report, it takes eight hours off of his battery
life and on one day they ran it 13 times, which was not really explained.”).) Additionally,
Mr. Miller was receiving treatment for mental health conditions, and his PO regularly reported
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he was attending one-on-one counseling, consistently meeting with his medication manager, and
taking all prescribed medications. (See PSI, pp.179, 180.)
Mr. Miller does not deny that his most recent probation violation was a result of his
consuming alcohol. (See July 2, 2019 Tr., p.10, L.18 – p.11, L.7.) He said that “[a] reckless
attitude motivated by substance abuse and or ‘alcohol’” was the cause of his relapse.
(PSI, p.195.) He also does not deny that he violated his probation in July 2018 by consuming
alcohol. (R., p.117; PSI, p.193.) However, the court at the time of his July 2018 violation found
that Mr. Miller was still a good candidate for probation, reinstating it and also sua sponte
reducing, without explanation, the period of probation he was required to serve. (R., pp.121-22.)
Mr. Miller asserts he was more successful on probation when he was required to attend
classes and AA meetings. He showed the court he was aware of this while awaiting disposition
of his probation violation by actively seeking community treatment options and mental health
counseling. (See August 20, 2019 Tr., p.9, L.17 – p.10, L.8.) He also encouraged the court to
reinstate probation with additional requirements that “he attend relapse prevention, that he attend
three AAs a week, that he attend an anger management class, and that he attend any other classes
at his probation officer’s discretion.” (August 20, 2019 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-14.) This
recommendation was also in line with that of the presentence investigator who stated “Mr. Miller
is a guarded candidate for reinstatement of his probation” if he would be able to complete
programming to deal with his underlying alcoholism. (See PSI, pp.197-98.) When Mr. Miller
was attending those classes he recommended, he was reported to be “a positive group member
that is apparently taking the program seriously.” (PSI, p.174.)
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Miller respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order revoking probation and
remand his case to the district court with an order that he be returned to probation.
DATED this 24 th day of December, 2019.

/s/ R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24 th day of December, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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